108 lines
8.2 KiB
Org Mode
108 lines
8.2 KiB
Org Mode
---
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title: "Reading Notes: \"The Symbol Grounding Problem\", Stevan Harnad"
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date: 2020-02-02
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---
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cite:harnad1990_symbol_groun_probl [[https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/250382/1/symgro.pdf][(PDF version)]] defined the /symbol
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grounding problem/, which is one of the most influential issues in
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natural language problems since the 1980s. The issue is to determine
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how a formal language system, consisting in simple symbols, can be
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imbued with any /meaning/.
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From the abstract:
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#+begin_quote
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How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made
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/intrinsic/ to the system, rather than just parasitic on the meanings
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in our heads? How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol tokens,
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manipulated solely on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be
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grounded in anything but other meaningless symbols?
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#+end_quote
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In this landmark paper, Harnad makes the issue explicit, in its
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context of cognitivism and competing theories of mind and
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intelligence. He then proposes an original solution based on a
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combination of symbolic and connectionist properties. The problem
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itself is still highly relevant to today's NLP advances, where the
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issue of extracting /meaning/ is still not solved.
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* What is the symbol grounding problem?
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** Context: cognitivism, symbolism, connectionism
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/Behaviourism/ was the dominant framework of experimental psychology in
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the first half of the 20th century. It grounded psychology firmly in
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an empirical setting, arguing that mental events are not observable,
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and that only external behaviour can be studied
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citep:miller2003_cognit_revol.
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In the 1950s, new theories, in particular Chomsky's theories in
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linguistics, started to question this approach and highlighted its
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limitations. /Cognitivism/ arose as a way to take into account
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internal mental states. It allowed scientists to make hypotheses about
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unobservable phenomenons, provided they made predictions testable in
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an experimental setting.
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Harnad defines a /symbol system/ as a set of arbitrary token with
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explicit rules (also in the form of tokens or strings of tokens) to
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combine them. Note that the set of rules should be explicit and not
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defined as posteriori, because nearly every phenomenon can be
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interpreted as following a set of rules.
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An additional (and most relevant for us) property of symbol systems is
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that they are /semantically interpretable/: we can associate a meaning
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in a systematic fashion to every token or string of tokens.
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This exposes /symbolism/, i.e. the view that cognition is a symbolic
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system. The alternative view, /connectionism/, has its root in
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biological models of the brain, and posits that the network of
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connections in the brain is what defines cognition, without any formal
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symbol system.
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#+begin_quote
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According to connectionism, cognition is not symbol manipulation but
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dynamic patterns of activity in a multilayered network of nodes or
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units with weighted positive and negative
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interconnections. citep:harnad1990_symbol_groun_probl
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#+end_quote
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One common criticism of connectionism is that it does not meet the
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compositionality criterion. Moreover, we cannot give a semantic
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interpretation of connectionist patterns in a systematic way as we can
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in symbolic systems. This issue was recently raised again by Gary
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Marcus in his recent book /Rebooting AI/
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citep:marcus2019_reboot_ai. Human cognition makes extensive use of
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internal representations. Chomsky's theories on the existence of a
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"universal grammar" is a good example of such internal structure for
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linguistics. These cognitive representations seem to be highly
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structured (as demonstrated by the work of Kahneman and Tversky
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citep:kahneman2011_think_fast_slow), and compositional. (See also his
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[[https://thegradient.pub/an-epidemic-of-ai-misinformation/][recent article]] in /The Gradient/.)
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#+CAPTION: Connectionism versus symbol systems (Taken from cite:harnad1990_symbol_groun_probl.)
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| *Strengths of connectionism:* |
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| 1) Nonsymbolic Function: As long as it does not aspire to be a symbol system, a connectionist network has the advantage of not being subject to the symbol grounding problem. |
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| 2) Generality: Connectionism applies the same small family of algorithms to many problems, whereas symbolism, being a methodology rather than an algorithm, relies on endless problem-specific symbolic rules. |
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| 3) "Neurosimilitude": Connectionist architecture seems more brain-like than a Turing machine or a digital computer. |
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| 4) Pattern Learning: Connectionist networks are especially suited to the learning of patterns from data. |
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| *Weaknesses if connectionism:* |
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| 1) Nonsymbolic Function: Connectionist networks, because they are not symbol systems, do not have the systematic semantic properties that many cognitive phenomena appear to have. |
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| 2) Generality: Not every problem amounts to pattern learning. Some cognitive tasks may call for problem-specific rules, symbol manipulation, and standard computation. |
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| 3) "Neurosimilitude": Connectionism's brain-likeness may be superficial and may (like toy models) camoflauge deeper performance limitations. |
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| *Strengths of symbol systems:* |
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| 1) Symbolic Function: Symbols have the computing power of Turing Machines and the systematic properties of a formal syntax that is semantically interpretable. |
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| 2) Generality: All computable functions (including all cognitive functions) are equivalent to a computational state in a Turing Machine. |
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| 3) Practical Successes: Symbol systems' ability to generate intelligent behavior is demonstrated by the successes of Artificial Intelligence. |
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| *Weaknesses of symbol systems:* |
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| 1) Symbolic Function: Symbol systems are subject to the symbol grounding problem. |
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| 2) Generality: Turing power is too general. The solutions to AI's many toy problems do not give rise to common principles of cognition but to a vast variety of ad hoc symbolic strategies. |
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** Exposing the issue: thought experiments
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* What the human mind does, and what AIs could do
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* References
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