156 lines
7.1 KiB
Org Mode
156 lines
7.1 KiB
Org Mode
---
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title: "The Dawning of the Age of Stochasticity"
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date: 2022-03-24
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tags: maths, foundations, paper, statistics, probability
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toc: false
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---
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#+begin_quote
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Mumford, David. 2000. “The Dawning of the Age of Stochasticity.”
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/Atti Della Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei. Classe Di Scienze Fisiche,
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Matematiche E Naturali. Rendiconti Lincei. Matematica E Applicazioni/
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11: 107–25. http://eudml.org/doc/289648.
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#+end_quote
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This article [cite:@mumford2000_dawnin_age_stoch] is an interesting call
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for a new set of foundations of mathematics on probability and
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statistics. It argues that logic has had its time, and now we should
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make random variables a first-class concept, as they would make for
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better foundations.
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* The taxonomy of mathematics
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[fn::{-} This is probably the best definition of mathematics I have
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seen. Before that, the most satisfying definition was "mathematics is
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what mathematicians do". It also raises an interesting question: what
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would the study of /non-reproducible/ mental objects be?]
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#+begin_quote
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The study of mental objects with reproducible properties is called mathematics.
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[cite:@davis2012_mathem_exper_study_edition]
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#+end_quote
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What are the categories of reproducible mental objects? Mumford
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considers the principal sub-fields of mathematics (geometry, analysis,
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algebra, logic) and argues that they are indeed rooted in common
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mental phenomena.
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Of these, logic, and the notion of proposition, with an absolute truth
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value attached to it, was made the foundation of all the
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others. Mumford's argument is that instead, the random variable is (or
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should be) the "paradigmatic mental object", on which all others can
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be based. People are constantly weighing likelihoods, evaluating
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plausibility, and sampling from posterior distributions to refine
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estimates.
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As such, random variables are rooted in our inspection of our own
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mental processes, in the self-conscious analysis of our minds. Compare
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to areas of mathematics arising from our experience with the physical
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world, through our perception of space (geometry), of forces and
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accelerations (analysis), or through composition of actions (algebra).
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The paper then proceeds to do a quick historical overview of the
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principal notions of probability, which mostly mirror the detailed
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historical perspective in [cite:@hacking2006_emerg_probab]. There is
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also a short summary of the work into the foundations of mathematics.
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Mumford also claims that although there were many advances in the
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foundation of probability (e.g. Galton, Gibbs for statistical physics,
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Keynes in economics, Wiener for control theory, Shannon for
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information theory), most important statisticians (R. A. Fisher)
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insisted on keeping the scope of statistics fairly limited to
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empirical data: the so-called "frequentist" school. (This is a vision
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of the whole frequentist vs Bayesian debate that I hadn't seen
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before. The Bayesian school can be seen as the one who claims that
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statistical inference can be applied more widely, even to real-life
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complex situations and thought processes. In this point of view, the
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emergence of the probabilistic method in various areas of science
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would be the strongest argument in favour of bayesianism.)
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* What is a "random variable"?
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Random variables are difficult to define. They are the core concept of
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any course in probability of statistics, but their full, rigorous
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definition relies on advanced measure theory, often unapproachable to
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beginners. Nevertheless, practitioners tend to be productive with
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basic introductions to probability and statistics, even without
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being able to formulate the explicit definition.
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Here, Mumford discusses the various definitions we can apply to the
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notion of random variable, from an intuitive and a formal point of
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view. The conclusion is essentially that a random variable is a
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complex entity that do not easily accept a satisfying definition,
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except from a purely formal and axiomatic point of view.
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This situation is very similar to the one for the notion of
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"set". Everybody can manipulate them on an intuitive level and grasp
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the basic properties, but the specific axioms are hard to grasp, and
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no definition is fully satisfying, as the debates on the foundations
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of mathematics can attest.
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* Putting random variables into the foundations
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The usual way of defining random variables is:
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1. predicate logic,
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2. sets,
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3. natural numbers,
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4. real numbers,
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5. measures,
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6. random variables.
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Instead, we could put random variables at the foundations, and define
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everything else in terms of that.
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There is no complete formulation of such a foundation, nor is it clear
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that it is possible. However, to make his case, Mumford presents two
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developments. One is from [[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Edwin_Thompson_Jaynes][E. T. Jaynes]], who has a complete formalism
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of Bayesian probability from a notion of "plausibility". With a few
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axioms, we can obtain an isomorphism between an intuitive notion of
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plausibility and a true probability function.
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The other example is a proof that the continuum hypothesis is false,
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using a probabilistic argument, due to Christopher Freiling. This
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proof starts from a notion of random variable that is incompatible
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with the usual definition in terms of measure theory. However, this
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leads Mumford to question whether a foundation of mathematics based on
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such a notion could get us rid of "one of the meaningless conundrums
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of set theory".
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* Stochastic methods have invaded classical mathematics
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This is probably the most convincing argument to give a greater
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importance to probability and statistical methods in the foundations
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of mathematics: there tend to be everywhere, and extremely
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productive. A prime example is obviously graph theory, where the
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"probabilistic method" has had a deep impact, thanks notably to
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Erdős. (See [cite:@alon2016_probab_method] and [[https://www.college-de-france.fr/site/timothy-gowers/index.htm][Timothy Gowers' lessons
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at the Collège de France]][fn::In French, but see also [[https://www.youtube.com/c/TimothyGowers0][his YouTube
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channel]].] on the probabilistic method for combinatorics and number
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theory.) Probabilistic methods also have a huge importance in the
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analysis of differential equations, chaos theory, and mathematical
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physics in general.
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* Thinking as Bayesian inference
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I think this is not very controversial in cognitive science: we do not
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think by composing propositions into syllogisms, but rather by
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inferring probabilities of certain statements being true. Mumford
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illustrates this very well with an example from Judea Pearl, which
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uses graphical models to represent thought processes. There is also a
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link with formal definitions of induction, such as PAC learning, which
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is very present in machine learning.
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I'll conclude this post by quoting directly the last paragraph of the
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article:
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#+begin_quote
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My overall conclusion is that I believe stochastic methods will
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transform pure and applied mathematics in the beginning of the third
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millennium. Probability and statistics will come to be viewed as the
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natural tools to use in mathematical as well as scientific modeling.
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The intellectual world as a whole will come to view logic as a
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beautiful elegant idealization but to view statistics as the standard
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way in which we reason and think.
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#+end_quote
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* References
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