Add post on high reliability organizations
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title: "High reliability organizations"
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date: 2022-06-01
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tags: management, social science
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toc: false
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---
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[cite/t:@dietterich2018_robus_artif_intel_robus_human_organ] is an
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interesting article about how to make /robust/ AI. High risk
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situations require the combined AI and human system to operate as a
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high reliability organization (HRO). Only such an organization can
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have sufficiently strong safety and reliability properties to ensure
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that powerful AI systems will not amplify human mistakes.
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* Reliability and high-reliability organizations
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The concept of high reliability organization (HRO) comes from
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[cite/t:@weick1999_organ]. Examples of HROs include nuclear power
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plants, aircraft carriers, air traffic control systems, and space
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shuttles. They share several characteristics: an unforgiving
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environment, vast potential for error, and dramatic scales in the case
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of a failure.
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[cite/t:@weick1999_organ] use the concept of "mindfulness", a kind of
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"enriched awareness" (which I interpret as "awareness with explicit
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processes"), consisting of the five elements listed below. This
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mindfulness leads to the capacity to discover and manage unexpected
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events, which in turn leads to reliability.
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* Characteristics of a high reliability organization
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An HRO is an organization with the following five attributes.
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** Preoccupation with failure
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There are many possible failures, most of them extremely
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rare. Consequently, HROs study all forms of failure and near misses
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with extreme carefulness and attention to detail. They also study the
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/absence/ of failure: why it didn't fail, and the possibility that no
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flaws were identified because we weren't attentive enough to potential
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flaws. HROs encourage reporting all mistakes and anomalies by anyone.
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** Reluctance to simplify interpretations
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HROs avoid having a single interpretation for a given event. They
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encourage generating multiple, complex, contradicting interpretations
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for every phenomenon. People are encouraged to have different views,
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different backgrounds (important for [[id:cdfc701f-7b6e-40ec-be94-db64a74aef0d][Hiring]]), and are re-trained
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often. To resolve the contradictions and the oppositions of views,
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interpersonal and human skills are highly valued, possibly more than
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technical skills.
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** Sensitivity to operations
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HROs rely a lot on "situational awareness". Basically, we have to
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check that there is no emergent phenomena (cf [[id:cabacd0d-2d40-450d-bbba-85c3539ff939][Complex systems]] and
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[[id:65e2d955-ab29-432f-9f48-30605e3f688f][Compositionality]]): all outputs should always be explained by the known
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inputs. Otherwise, there might be other forces at work that need to be
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identified and dealt with. A small group of people may be dedicated to
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this awareness at all times.
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** Commitments to resilience
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HROs train people to be experts at combining all processes and events
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to improve their reactions and their improvisation skills. Everyone
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should be an expert at managing surprise. This can include rapid
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formation of ad hoc teams to improvise solutions to novel problems.
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** Underspecification of structures
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There is no fixed reporting path, anyone can raise an alarm and halt
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operations. Everyone can take decisions related to their technical
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expertise. Information is spread directly through the organization, so
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that people with the right expertise are warned first. Power is
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delegated to operation personal, but management is completely
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available at all times.
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* HROs vs non-HROs
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Non-HROs increasingly exhibit some properties of HROs. This may be due
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to the fact that highly competitive environments with short cycles
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create unforgiving conditions (high performance standards, low
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tolerance for errors). However, most everyday organizations do not put
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failure at the heart of their thinking.
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Failures in non-HROs come from the same sources: cultural assumptions
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on the effectiveness or accuracy of previous precautions measures.
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Preoccupation with failure also reveal the couplings and the complex
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interactions in the manipulated systems. This in turn leads to
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uncoupling and less emergent behaviour over time. People understand
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better long-term, complex interactions.
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* Reliability vs performance, and the importance of learning
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An interesting discussion is around the (alleged) trade-off between
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reliability and performance. It is assumed that HROs put the focus on
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reliability at the cost of throughput. As a consequence, it may not
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make sense for ordinary organizations to put as much emphasis on
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safety and reliability, as it may cost money.
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However, investments in safety can also be viewed as investments in
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learning. HROs view safety and reliability as a process of search and
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learning (constant search for anomalies, learning the interactions
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between the parts of a complex system, ensuring we can link outputs to
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known inputs). As such, investments in safety encourage collective
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knowledge production and dissemination.
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Mindfulness also stimulates intrinsic motivation and perceptions of
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efficacy and control, which increase individual performance. (People
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who strongly believe they are in control of their own output are more
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motivated and more efficient.)
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HROs may encourage mindfulness based on operational necessity in front
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of the catastrophic consequences of any failure, but non-HROs can
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adopt the same practice to boost efficiency and learning to gain
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competitive advantage.
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Additional lessons that can be learned from HROs (implicit in previous
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discussion):
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1. The expectation of surprise is an organizational resource because
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it promotes real-time attentiveness and discovery.
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2. Anomalous events should be treated as outcomes rather than
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accidents, to encourage search for sources and causes.
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3. Errors should be made as conspicuous as possible to undermine
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self-deception and concealment.
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4. Reliability requires diversity, duplication, overlap, and a varied
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response repertoire, whereas efficiency requires homogeneity,
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specialization, non-redundancy, and standardization.
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5. Interpersonal skills are just as important in HROs as are technical
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skills.
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* References
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